Ernest Sosa extends his distinctive approach to epistemology, intertwining issues concerning the role of the will in judgment and belief with issues of epistemic evaluation. Questions about skepticism and the nature of knowledge are at the forefront. The answers defended are new in their explicit and sustained focus on judgment and epistemic agency. While noting that human knowledge trades on distinctive psychological capacities, Sosa also emphasizes the role of the social in human knowledge. Basic animal knowledge is supplemented by a level of reflective knowledge focused on judgment, and a level of 'knowing full well' that is distinctive of the animal that is rational.

IntroductionPart I: Virtue Epistemology Extended and Unified 1. The Unity of Action, Perception, and Knowledge2. Virtue Epistemology: Character versus CompetencePart II: A Better Virtue Epistemology 3. Judgment and Agency4. A Better Virtue Epistemology Further Developed5. Objections and Replies, with a Methodological AfterthoughtPart III: Knowledge and Agency 6. Knowledge and Action7. Intentional Action and Judgment8. Social Roots of Human Knowledge9. Epistemic AgencyPart IV: Historical Antecedents 10. Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human Agency11. Descartes' Pyrrhonian Virtue Epistemology

Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University, New JerseyErnest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University.